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Secure and Private Cloud Storage Systems with
Random Linear Fountain Codes
Mohsen Karimzadeh Kiskani† and Hamid R. Sadjadpour†
Abstract—An information theoretic approach to security and
privacy called Secure And Private Information Retrieval (SAPIR)
is introduced. SAPIR is applied to distributed data storage
systems. In this approach, random combinations of all contents
are stored across the network. Our coding approach is based on
Random Linear Fountain (RLF) codes. To retrieve a content,
a group of servers collaborate with each other to form a
Reconstruction Group (RG). SAPIR achieves asymptotic perfect
secrecy if at least one of the servers within an RG is not
compromised. Further, a Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
scheme based on random queries is proposed. The PIR approach
ensures the users privately download their desired contents
without the servers knowing about the requested contents indices.
The proposed scheme is adaptive and can provide privacy against
a significant number of colluding servers.
Index Terms—Cloud Storage, Security, Private Information
Retrieval
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud networks have become a popular platform for data
storage during the past decade. Cloud systems have been used
in different applications such as healthcare [1]. Security of the
stored data has always been a major concern for many cloud
service providers. Many cloud service providers use encryption
algorithms to encrypt the data on their servers. Dropbox,
for instance, is using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
to store the contents on its servers1. Since the encryption
algorithms are computationally secure, an adversary may be
able to break them with time. For instance, Data Encryption
Standard (DES) which was once the official Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard (FIPS) in US is not considered
secure anymore. An interesting problem in highly sensitive
cloud services would then be to design information theoretic
secure solutions which are immune to attackers in time.
To achieve perfect information theoretic secrecy using
Shannon cipher system [2], the number of keys should be
equal to the number of messages. Therefore, to retrieve the
contents from the cloud using an information theoretically
secure approach in which the contents are directly encoded
with a different key, each user needs to store a huge number
of keys which is not practical. In this paper, we propose to
use the storage capability of the trusted servers to generate the
keys by using the contents themselves and achieve asymptotic
perfect secrecy. Our proposed technique is based on Random
Linear Fountain (RLF) codes [3]. RLF codes have been shown
[4]–[6] to be very useful in distributed storage systems.
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On the other hand, in many distributed storage applica-
tions like Peer-to-Peer (P2P) distributed storage systems or
distributed storage systems in which some of the servers are
under the control of an oppressive government, a user wants to
download a content in a way that the servers cannot determine
which content is requested by the user. This is widely known
as Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem.
Our next contribution in this paper is a novel technique to
address the PIR problem in distributed storage systems. Users
use random queries to request data from the servers. These
random queries are designed in a way that they can be used
to retrieve any desired content while preventing any malicious
agent with the knowledge of up to half of the random queries
to gain information about the requested content. This is an
important feature of the proposed technique that provides
privacy in the presence of many colluding servers. Such a
feature has not been presented in prior information theoretic
PIR approaches [7] for coded storage systems. The proposed
Secure And Private Information Retrieval (SAPIR) scheme
provides both security and privacy for information retrieval.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is
dedicated to the related work on PIR and security in distributed
storage systems. The assumptions and problem formulation are
described in section III. We study the security and PIR aspects
of SAPIR in sections IV and V, respectively. The simulation
results are provided in section VI and the paper is concluded
in section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this paper, we use Random Linear Fountain (RLF)
codes [3] to encode the contents within the servers in the
network. Significant capacity improvement can be achieved in
wireless ad hoc and cellular networks [4]–[6], [8]–[16] using
RLF codes. The application of fountain codes in distributed
storage systems was previously studied in [17]. Similar coding
techniques has been previously used in references like [18]–
[25] to provide quality of service in wireless systems.
The capacity of wireless ad hoc cached networks was
studied in [5] and it was shown that RLF codes can achieve
perfect secrecy asymptotically without considering the PIR
problem. In the current paper, RLF codes are used to simul-
taneously achieve security and privacy in distributed cloud
storage systems.
While MDS codes [26], [27] show good repair capability,
these codes are not particularly designed to provide security.
Authors in [28] have studied the security of distributed storage
systems with MDS codes and [29] has proposed a construction
2for repairable and secure fountain codes. Reference [29]
achieves security by concatenating Gabidulin codes with Re-
pairable Fountain Codes (RFC). Their specific design allows
to use Locally Repairable Fountain Codes for secure repair of
the lost data. Unlike [29] which has focused on the security
of the repair links using concatenated codes, the current paper
presents simultaneous security and privacy of the data storage
nodes by only using RLF codes. References [30] and [31] have
studied the problem of security in the presence of overhearing
interference in cooperative communications. Further [32], [33]
studied the same problem on multi-tier networks.
The authors in [34] have numerically studied the wiretap
network with a simple topology in which there is a relaying
node between the transmitter and the receiver. In the current
paper, we considered the general network with a cloud infras-
tructure in which the servers are cooperating to reconstruct the
contents.
The idea of PIR was originally introduced in [35] for
uncoded databases. Recently, there has been a renewed interest
in studying PIR for storage systems utilizing different coding
techniques. Reference [36] was among the first references to
study the problem of PIR for coded storage systems. They
proved that with only one extra bit, PIR can be achieved.
However, the solution in [36] requires that the number of
servers grows with the data record size. Reference [37] as-
sumed that the number of servers is fixed and established the
trade-off between storage and retrieval costs and demonstrated
the fundamental limits on the cost of PIR for coded storage
systems. The authors in [7] studied the problem of PIR for
MDS coded storage systems and introduced a scheme to
achieve PIR in MDS coded databases but the security aspect
was not addressed in that paper. They have also assumed that
the databases are able to store all the contents which may
not be a realistic assumption. Unlike prior work [7], [36],
[37] which have only studied PIR for coded databases, we are
interested in achieving simultaneous security and PIR. Further,
as far as we know, this is the first work to study the problem
of PIR for a fountain coded-based distributed storage system.
The proposed PIR scheme is easily scalable to the cases when
up to half of the servers are colluding to obtain information
about the content or content index which makes this technique
very robust against large number of colluding servers.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The network is composed of n servers each capable of stor-
ing h contents. These servers are denoted by N1,N2, . . . ,Nn.
A total number of m contents exist within the network and
each content has M bits, i.e., f1, f2, . . . , fm.
A. RLF Coding-Based Storage
The contents are randomly encoded and stored on the
servers during the data preloading phase. The encoded file in
the jth storage location of the ith server for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
and j = 1, 2, . . . , h will have the form
cij =
m∑
k=0
vi,jk fk = fv
i
j , (1)
where2 f = [f1 f2 . . . fm] denotes the 1 × m vector of all
contents and vij denotes an m× 1 random encoding vector of
0’s and 1’s. Each content fi belongs to the Galois Field F2M ,
i.e. f ∈ Fm2M . Throughout the paper, unless otherwise stated
we assume that all the vector and matrix operations are in F2.
The encoded files stored in server Ni are ci = [ci1 c
i
2 . . . c
i
h]
where ci ∈ Fh2M . Note that ci = fVi where Vi is the m× h
random encoding matrix for server Ni.
In RLF all random vectors vij are chosen independently and
uniformly from Fm2 which results in a random uniform choice
of the encoding matrix Vi where each element can be either 0
or 1 with equal probability. Such an encoding matrix may not
necessarily be full rank and may contain linearly dependent
rows. This will result in redundant use of storage and may
jeopardize the security by revealing more information. Hence,
we propose a full rank encoding scheme based on RLF codes
in which randomly created encoding vectors vij are discarded
if they already exist in the span of the previously selected
random encoding vectors. In other words, for each server we
select h linearly independent vectors to construct a full rank
matrix Vi of size m× h for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The encoding can be performed in a decentralized way. This
means that each server can fill up its storage space indepen-
dently of all the other servers during the data preloading phase.
It can be shown [6] that the average minimum number of
encoded files required to decode any desired content is very
close to the optimal value of m.
B. Reconstruction Groups (RG)
After the data preloading phase, users can reconstruct their
desired contents during content delivery phase. A desired file
fr can be written as fr = fer, where er is an all zero vector
of size m × 1 except in the rth location is equal to 1. To
retrieve fr, the user needs to access enough encoded files on
the network servers in order to construct er via v
i
j’s.
Since codes are constructed in Fm2 , users need m linearly
independent encoding vectors to retrieve any of the m con-
tents. We assume that servers are divided into many different
RGs . Servers within each RG collaborate with each other
to retrieve any requested content. Therefore, the number of
encoded files within a single RG should be at least equal tom.
The RGs are represented by J1,J2, . . . ,Ju and the number
of servers within their corresponding RGs by J1, J2, . . . , Ju
where,
∑u
i=1 Ji = n. It is shown in [6] that the average
minimum number of encoded files within each RG to retrieve
all the contents is only slightly larger than m. Therefore, for
each RG Ji where 1 ≤ i ≤ u, the minimum value of Ji is
only slightly larger than m
h
. Notice that if Ji is smaller than
m
h
,
then the servers will not be able to form a full rank matrix to
retrieve all desired contents. In the case that storage systems
store uncoded contents, we need exactly m cache locations
for storing files which is very close to our RLF technique and
demonstrates that our RLF-coding based approach efficiently
utilizes storage space. For large values of h, i.e. h ≥ m, each
server can become an RG by itself.
2Throughout the paper, the vectors are denoted in bold characters.
3C. Content Retrieval
Each RG Jk stores Jkh ≥ m randomly encoded files. The
matrices Vi of the Jk servers in the RG form a full rank
matrix V = [V1 V2 . . . VJk ]m×Jkh. Therefore, any content
with index r can be retrieved from the servers by solving the
linear equation Vyr = er in F2. Since this matrix is full rank,
one possible solution can be given as
yr = V
T
(
VVT
)−1
er. (2)
To solve Vyr = er, servers within the RG should send their
corresponding encoding matrices Vi to one of the RG servers
called Ns that generates V and computes yr from the above
equation3. If yr = [y
1
r y
2
r . . . y
Jk
r ]
T is such a solution, where
yir is a h× 1 local decoding vector for server Ni, then server
Ns sends yir to server Ni and Ni then transmits fViy
i
r to the
requesting user. All of the server responses are then aggregated
by the user to retrieve fr as
fr = fer = fVyr =
Jk∑
i=1
fViy
i
r. (3)
However, this solution reveals the identity of the downloaded
content to all the servers of the RG. This simple solution
cannot be used for PIR but we will show in section IV that
perfect secrecy can be achieved with this solution. A solution
to preserve the privacy of the users is presented in section V.
IV. SECURITY
This section is dedicated to the study of security of our
approach. If an adversary is able to wiretap all of the com-
munication links between the RG servers and the user, it can
perfectly retrieve fr using equation (3). We prove that perfect
communication secrecy can be achieved when the adversary
can wiretap all communication links between servers and user
except one. We will prove this for the case when the user
directly sends the request er to the servers and the servers
respond accordingly. Under this scenario, the adversary knows
the requested content index but still unable to reduce its
equivocation about the requested content.
Consider RG Jk and without loss of generality, assume
that an adversary can wiretap all of the links between servers
N1,N2, . . . ,NJk−1 and the user. Further assume that the user
wants to directly download the content fr from these servers
by sending the query er to all these servers. Such a scenario
is much more vulnerable to adversarial attacks compared to a
scenario in which the requested base vectors are expanded in
terms of random queries in order to guarantee privacy. When
the query er is received by all the servers,they will collectively
solve the linear equationVyr = er to find the decoding vector
yr. Equation (3) can be rewritten as
fr = fer = fVyr =
Jk−1∑
i=1
fViy
i
r + fVJky
Jk
r . (4)
Since we assume that all of the responses from the servers
N1,N2, . . . ,NJk−1 can be wiretapped, we can assume that
3Notice that the servers of an RG only need to send this information to
Ns once. This could be done even right after the data preloading phase.
the first part of the above equation is known while the second
part is secret to the adversary. Lets define Sr ,
∑Jk−1
i=1 fViy
i
r
and Tr , fVJky
Jk
r . The requested content can be written as
fr = Sr + Tr and since all operations are in F2, we have
Sr = fr + Tr. (5)
This is similar to the Shannon cipher system [2] in which an
encoding function e : M×K→ C is mapping a message M ∈
M and a key K ∈ K to a codeword C ∈ C. In our problem fr,
Tr, and Sr can be regarded as the message, key, and codeword
respectively. The eavesdropper knows the encoded file Sr but it
cannot obtain any information about the message fr if a unique
key Tr with uniform distribution is used for each message.
The following theorem provides the necessary and sufficient
condition [38] to obtain perfect secrecy.
Theorem 1. If |M| = |K| = |C|, a coding scheme achieves
perfect secrecy if and only if
• For each pair (M,C) ∈ (M × C), there exists a unique
key K ∈ K such that C = e(M,K).
• The key K is uniformly distributed in K.
Proof. The proof can be found in section 3.1 of [38].
We will use Theorem 1 to prove that our approach can
achieve asymptotic perfect secrecy. To use this theorem, first
we prove that for large enough values of m, the key Tr is
uniformly distributed.
Lemma 1. The asymptotic distribution of bits of coded files
on the servers tend to uniform.
Proof. The proof is skipped due to page limitations. A similar
proof appears in [13].
This lemma paves the way to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the proposed full rank encoding scheme if
m is large but m < 2h, then the proposed encoded strategy
provides asymptotic perfect secrecy against any eavesdropper
which is capable of wiretapping all but one of the links from
the servers to a user in a RG.
Proof. We formulated this problem as a Shannon cipher
system assuming that M = fr, K = Tr, and C = Sr. The
condition m < 2h ensures that a unique vector yJkr exists for
each requested message. Therefore, since full rank encoding
scheme is used, then VJk will be full rank and Tr guarantees
that a unique key exists for each requested message fr. Notice
that if the size of the RG is large enough, then the unique
choice of the key does not affect the solvability of the linear
equation Vyr = er. Therefore, for any pair (m,C) ∈ (M,C),
a unique key K ∈ K exists such that C = m+ K. Further, we
are guaranteed to have |M| = |K| = |C|.
Notice that the key K = Tr belongs to the set of all possible
bit strings with M bits. Lemma 1 proves that each encoded
file is uniformly distributed among all M -bit strings. Hence
each key which is a unique summation of such encoded files
is uniformly distributed among the set of all M -bit strings.
In other words, regardless of the distribution of the bits in
files, Tr can be any bit string with equal probability for large
4values of m. Therefore, the conditions in Theorem 1 are met
and perfect secrecy is achieved.
Remark 1. In this paper, we have assumed that the decoding
vector yr and the encoding matrixVi are computed during the
data preloading phase securely. Therefore, the eavesdropper
cannot decode this information on any of the servers or have
any knowledge about the key Tr.
Remark 2. A naive approach to achieve perfect secrecy using
the Shannon cipher system is to choose m different keys from
the set of uniform M -bit strings and store them and use them
to encode the files. However, since the file sizeM is very large,
this requires a significant amount of storage space to store the
keys on the trusted servers which doubles the required storage
capacity. The important contribution of our approach is that
users do not need to store the keys and yet perfect secrecy can
still be achieved with the help of trusted servers.
V. PRIVATE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
In PIR, the goal is to provide conditions that when a user
downloads the content fr with index r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the
content index remains a secret to all of the servers. This is
desirable in applications like Peer-to-Peer networks and in
situations where some servers may have been compromised
by the adversary. To achieve PIR, users send queries to the
servers and servers respond to users based on those queries.
These queries should be designed in a way that reveal no
information to the servers about the requested content index.
To formally define the information theoretic PIR, let R be a
random variable denoting the requested content index and let
Ql be a subset of at most l queries. We have the following
definition.
Definition 1. A PIR scheme is capable of achieving perfect
information theoretic PIR against i colluding servers if for the
set Ql of all queries available to all of these servers and any
number of contents we have
I(R;Ql) = 0 (6)
where I(.) is the mutual information function.
A. Random Query Generation
To achieve PIR, the user chooses a fixed ǫ > 0 and sets
Aǫ , m + ⌈log2(
1
ǫ
)⌉. Then it picks Aǫ query vectors from
Fm2 uniformly at random and statistically independent of each
other. These will be the set of random queries. Therefore,
we will have a set Qǫ = {q1,q2, . . . ,qAǫ} of i.i.d. random
query vectors. In the following, we will prove that with a
probability of at least 1 − ǫ, these random vectors span the
whole m-dimensional space of Fm2 . The properties of random
vectors that we have used for our coding technique, had been
previously studied in [39].
Theorem 3. Let Q be a matrix of size m× l whose elements
are independent random variables taking the values 0 and 1
with equal probability and let ρm(l) be the rank of the matrix
Q in F2. Let s ≥ 0 and c be fixed integers, c + s ≥ 0. If
m→∞ and l = m+ c, then
P[ρm(l) = m− s]→
2−s(s+c)
∞∏
i=s+1
(
1−
1
2i
) s+c∏
j=1
(
1−
1
2j
)−1
(7)
where the last product equals 1 for c+ s = 0.
Proof. This is Theorem 3.2.1 in page 126 of [39].
Corollary 1. For l = m+ c where c ≥ 0, if m→∞ we have
P[ρ(l) = m]→
∞∏
i=c+1
(
1−
1
2i
)
(8)
Proof. The proof follows for s = 0 in Theorem 3.
In the following, we will use these results for our proofs.
Definition 2. We define the random variable A as the mini-
mum number of random query vectors q1,q2, . . . ,qi to span
the whole space of Fm2 .
Lemma 2. The probability of the event that A < m is zero
and for any c ≥ 0 we have
P[A ≤ m+ c]→
∞∏
i=c+1
(
1−
1
2i
)
(9)
Proof. This is a direct result of Corollary 1.
Lemma 3. The probability of the event that A = m + c is
less than 2−c for any c ≥ 0.
Proof. Let F (c) , P[A ≤ m + c]. It is easy to verify from
equation (9) that for m→∞ we have
F (c)→
F (c− 1)
1− 12c
. (10)
Since F (c) ≤ 1, from equation (10) we arrive at
F (c− 1) ≤ 1− 2−c. (11)
Hence,
P[A = m+ c] = F (c)− F (c− 1)→ F (c− 1)
(
1
1− 12c
− 1
)
= F (c− 1)
(
1
1− 12c
− 1
)
=
F (c− 1)
2c − 1
≤
1− 2−c
2c − 1
= 2−c
Lemma 4. The probability of the event that A ≤ m+ c is at
least 1− 2−c and at most 1− 2−(c+1) for any c ≥ 0. i.e.
1− 2−c ≤ F (c) ≤ 1− 2−(c+1) (12)
Proof. The upper bound is already proved in equation (11).
From Lemma 3 we have,
F (c) = P[A ≤ m+ c] = 1− P[A > m+ c]
5= 1−
∞∑
i=c+1
P[m+ i] ≥ 1−
∞∑
i=c+1
2−i = 1− 2−c
Theorem 4. With a probability of at least 1 − ǫ, the set of
random queries Qǫ = {q1,q2, . . . ,qAǫ} where Aǫ = m +
⌈log2(
1
ǫ
)⌉ spans the whole m-dimensional space of Fm2 .
Proof. From Lemma 4, we have
P[A ≤ Aǫ = m+ ⌈log2(
1
ǫ
)⌉] ≥ 1− 2−⌈log2(
1
ǫ
)⌉ ≥ 1− ǫ
This proves the theorem.
Theorem 4 states that the probability of spanning the m-
dimensional space can arbitrarily go to 1 provided that the
number of random vectors increases logarithmically with
1
ǫ
. For example, to span the m-dimensional space with a
probability of at least 0.99, it is enough to only have m + 7
random vectors. Using these random query vectors, we can
now show that even with a large number of colluding servers
no information about the requested content index can be
obtained. To prove this result, we need to prove some lemmas.
Let Qǫ , [q1 q2 . . . qAǫ ] be the matrix of size m × Aǫ
whose columns are random query vectors. Matrix Qǫ contains
Aǫ statistically independent random vectors. Let Br
x
be the
event that for a specific vector x ∈ FA
ǫ
2 and a specific base
vector er, we have Q
ǫx = er.
Lemma 5. For any specific non-zero vector x ∈ FA
ǫ
2 we have
P[Br
x
] = P[Qǫx = er] = 2
−m. (13)
Proof. Lets assume vector x has k ones. If Qǫx = er,
then k vectors from the set of all vectors q1,q2, . . . ,qAǫ
are added together to create er. Lets denote these vectors by
qe1 ,qe2 , . . . ,qek . Let q
ej
r denote the rth element of vector
qej . Since the vectors qe1 ,qe2 , . . . ,qek are independent and
their elements are also mutually independent, using binary
summations in F2, we have
P[Br
x
] = P[Qǫx = er] = P[
k∑
j=1
qejr = 1]
m∏
l′=1
l′ 6=r
P[
k∑
j=1
q
ej
l′ = 0].
(14)
We can easily prove that P[
∑k
j=1 q
ej
r = 1] =
1
2 . To prove this,
we can use induction on k. This equation is valid for the base
case k = 1. Assume that it is valid for k − 1. We have
P[
k∑
j=1
qejr = 1] = P[q
ek
r = 1]P[
k−1∑
j=1
qejr = 0]
+ P[qekr = 0]P[
k−1∑
j=1
qejr = 1] =
1
2
Similarly, it is easy to prove that P[
∑k
j=1 q
ej
l′ = 0] =
1
2 .
Hence, equation (14) can be simplified to P[Br
x
] = P[Qǫx =
er] = 2
−m.
Lemma 6. The following inequalities hold for 1 ≤ j ≤ i,
1
i+ 1
2iH(
j
i
) ≤
(
i
j
)
≤ 2iH(
j
i
) (15)
where H(α) denotes the binary entropy function, i.e. H(α) =
−α log2(α) − (1− α) log2(1− α).
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix of [40].
We are now ready to prove the following theorem which
shows that accessing a significant number of random queries
in Qǫ cannot help in reconstructing any of the base vectors
for large m.
Theorem 5. Consider the set Qǫ = {q1,q2, . . . ,qAǫ} of
Aǫ = m+⌈log2(
1
ǫ
)⌉ statistically independent random uniform
query vectors. For large enough values of m with probability
arbitrarily close to 1, none of the base vectors exist in the span
of any subset Ql ⊂ Qǫ with cardinality of at most l = ⌊δm⌋
where δ < 0.5.
Proof. Consider any base vector er and a non-zero vector x ∈
FA
ǫ
2 . For this vector, computing Q
ǫx in F2 is equivalent to
adding a subset of columns ofQǫ whose set of indices is equal
to the set of indices of non-zero elements in x. If Qǫx = er
for some x ∈ FA
ǫ
2 , then any subset Ql ⊂ Q
ǫ which contains
the column vectors of Qǫ whose set of indices is equal to the
set of indices of non-zero elements in x also spans er. In fact,
the number of non-zero elements of x or Hamming weight of
x (i.e., Ham(x)) is equal to the number of vectors that should
be added to reconstruct er.
Consider all vectors x ∈ FA
ǫ
2 with Hamming weight less
than or equal to l = ⌊δm⌋ where δ < 0.5. Lemma 5 shows that
for any x, we have P[Br
x
] = 2−m. Therefore, the asymptotic
probability of existence of a subset Ql ⊂ Qǫ with a cardinality
of at most l = ⌊δm⌋ which spans er for large values of m
can be found as
lim
m→∞
P[∃Ql ⊆ Q
ǫ|card{Ql} ≤ l = ⌊δm⌋, er ∈ span{Ql}],
= lim
m→∞
P[
⋃
x∈FA
ǫ
2
,Ham(x)≤l
Br
x
]
(a)
≤ lim
m→∞
∑
x∈FA
ǫ
2
,Ham(x)≤l
P[Br
x
],
(b)
= lim
m→∞
l∑
i=1
(
Aǫ
i
)
2−m
(c)
≤ lim
m→∞
l
(
Aǫ
l
)
2−m,
(d)
≤ lim
m→∞
l
(
m
l
)
2−m = lim
m→∞
⌊δm⌋
(
m
⌊δm⌋
)
2−m,
(e)
≤ lim
m→∞
δm2mH(
⌊δm⌋
m )2−m
(f)
≤ lim
m→∞
δm2−m(1−H(δ))
(g)
= 0,
where inequality (a) comes from the union bound and (b)
holds by using Lemma 5 and counting all the vectors x with
Hamming weight less than l = ⌊δm⌋ and inequality (e) comes
from Lemma 6. Notice that (c), (d), (e) and (f) are only valid
for cases when δ < 0.5. This shows that the probability of
existence of any desired base in the span of any subset of
vectors with cardinality less than ⌊δm⌋ goes to zero as m
grows if δ < 0.5.
Remark 3. In practice the user generates enough number
of random vectors to span the whole m-dimensional space.
6Hence, it has a set Q = {q1,q2, . . . ,qA} of A ≥ m
total random vectors. Then it chooses a subset Qfull =
{qt1 ,qt2 , . . . ,qtm} ⊆ Q of m linearly independent vectors
from them and use them as its query vectors. This way it is
guaranteed that the m queries will span the whole space of
Fm2 and any base vector er can be represented in terms of
these independent query vectors as
er =
m∑
k=1
dkqtk (16)
The following lemma shows that the average required number
of random vectors to span Fm2 is very close tom so in practice
only a few number of random queries more than m is needed
to span Fm2 .
Lemma 7. If qj is a random vector belonging to F
m
2 with
elements having uniform distribution, the average minimum
number of vectors qj to span the whole space of F
m
2 equals
Eq = m+
m∑
i=1
1
2i − 1
= m+ γ, (17)
where γ asymptotically approaches the Erdo˝s–Borwein con-
stant (≈ 1.6067).
Proof. The proof can be found in [6].
Remark 4. Since Qfull ⊆ Q, if any vector er does not exist in
the span of any subset Ql ⊂ Q, of l random query vectors, it
will not exist in the span of any subset Ql ⊂ Qfull of l random
query vectors in Qfull too. So, Theorem 5 remains valid for
this choice of random queries too. This means that in practice,
every base vector is guaranteed to exist in the span of the m
query vectors but none of the base vectors exist in the span of
any subset Ql ⊂ Q with probability close to one if l < ⌊δm⌋
for δ < 0.5.
B. Responding to Queries
In this section, we assume that the user has chosen m
linearly independent random query vectors in Qfull and wants
to download the rth content. Since Qfull is a set of vectors
which spans the whole space of Fm2 , the user can expand
the base vector er in terms of the query vectors in Qfull
as mentioned in (16). Hence, the requested content can be
expanded in terms of query vectors as
fr = fer = f
(
m∑
k=1
dkqtk
)
=
m∑
k=1
dkfqtk (18)
where dk ∈ F2 is either 0 or 1. Based on equation (18) the
user requests some parts of the desired content from each RG
so that none of the RGs can understand any information about
the requested content.
To accomplish PIR, the user partitions the set of random
queries qtk whose corresponding decoding gains dk are non-
zero into a disjoint subsets Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qa. The choice of
number of subsets (i.e. a) depends on the number of colluding
servers. Each subset of queries is then sent to a different RG
RG1 RG2
...
user
RGa
∑
qtk
∈Q1
fqtk
∑
qtk
∈Q2
fqtk
∑
qtk
∈Qa
fqtk
Q1 Q2 Qa
Fig. 1. Multiple RGs respond to queries sent from the user. This allows the
user to privately download its desired content.
as depicted in Figure 1. Therefore, the requested content can
be retrieved as
fr =
∑
qtk
∈Qfull
dk 6=0
fqtk =
a∑
i=1
∑
qtk
∈Qi
fqtk (19)
The ultimate goal in PIR is to prevent any colluding group
of servers to gain information about the requested content
index. Assume that the number of colluding servers is b.
If any two colluding servers lie within the same RG, they
receive the same subset of queries from the user. Therefore,
without loss of generality we consider the worst scenario in
which all the colluding servers lie within different RGs and
all these b colluding servers are able to collaboratively obtain
all the queries Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qb. Based on Theorem 5, if the
number of all query vectors in Ql = ∪bi=1Qi is less than
⌊δm⌋ for some δ < 0.5, then no information can be achieved
about the requested content index. This provides significant
PIR capability for this technique.
Notice that since RGs have full rank encoding matrices, they
can respond to any query that they receive. Assume that RG
Ji with the full rank encoding matrix V = [V1 V2 . . . VJi ]
receives the set of queries Qi. This RG needs to send∑
qtk
∈Qi
fqtk to the user. It can solve the linear equation
Vpi =
∑
qtk
∈Qi
qtk (20)
in Galois Field F2 for pi as
pi = V
T
(
VVT
)−1 ∑
qtk
∈Qi
qtk

 . (21)
Similar to before the serverNs in the RG Ji which has already
acquired all the information in matrix V, computes the overal
query decoding solution pi which is a vector of size Jih× 1.
If this vector is divided into Ji equal size pieces as pi =
[p1i p
2
i . . . p
Ji
i ]
T , then the server Ns sends the jth portion
of pi to server Nj in the RG Ji. More precisely, server Nj
receives a query response vector p
j
i of size h × 1 from Ns
for each j = 1, 2, . . . , Ji. Then the server Nj sends fVjp
j
i
back to the coordinating server Ns. The coordinating server
Ns then aggregates all the data received from multiple servers
in the RG to construct
∑
qtk
∈Qi
fqtk as
∑
qtk
∈Qi
fqtk = fVpi =
Ji∑
j=1
fVjp
j
i . (22)
7The coordinating server Ns in the RG Ji then transmits∑
qtk
∈Qi
fqtk to the user.
Each RG only transmits one encoded file to the user.
However all the servers within an RG need to collaborate with
each other prior to responding to the queries sent from the user.
Notice that communication between the servers are carried
using high bandwidth fiber optic links while transmissions
from the servers to the user are performed over low bandwidth
links. In our computation of communication cost for achieving
PIR, we only consider communication between the servers and
the user in the low bandwidth links.
Remark 5. It is worth mentioning that in this approach the
coordinations between servers in an RG is necessary because
the servers do not have full storage capacity to store all the
contents. In fact if we also assume each server has high storage
capacity similar to [7], then each server can act as an RG and
there will be no communications between servers.
C. Trade-off Between Communication Cost and Privacy Level
In order to achieve PIR, each user needs to download more
information. This additional bandwidth utilization is referred
to as communication Price of Privacy (cPoP) [7] which is
defined as follows. Note that the cost of sending queries are
ignored because it is assumed that the size of contents are
significantly higher than the size of the queries.
Definition 3. The communication Price of Privacy (cPoP) is
the ratio of the total number of bits downloaded by the user
from the servers to the size of the requested file.
To explain the trade-off between communication cost and
level of privacy, assume that the user divides the queries into
a equal size groups of queries and sends each group of queries
to a different RG. Each RG should respond to at most ⌈m
a
⌉
queries. If b RGs collude to gain some information about
the requested content index, then they will have access to
a total of at most b⌈m
a
⌉ queries. We proved that knowing
⌊δm⌋ queries asymptotically gives no information about the
requested content index if δ < 0.5. Hence, if b < a2 , then
the colluding RGs will get no information about the requested
content index. Therefore, if less than half of the RGs collude
to gain some information about the requested content index,
they cannot gain any information. We can increase a to get the
maximum possible level of privacy. However, the downside of
increasing a is that the communication Price of Privacy (cPoP)
will also increase.
As discussed earlier, if the queries are sent to a RGs then
a responses from these RGs are required to retrieve a content.
Since each RG transmits an encoded file of size M bits to the
user the total number of bits downloaded by the user will be
equal to aM and therefore the cPoP will be equal to aM/M =
a.
D. Full Size Servers
Assume that the servers have large storage capability such
that each RG is only composed of 1 server. Our assumption of
full rank encoding scheme guarantees that servers with storage
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Fig. 2. Probability of the event that at least one base exists in the span of
any subset of l = ⌊δm⌋ random vectors.
ability of h ≥ m encoded files can be used to retrieve any
desired content. In [7], the authors studied the use of MDS
codes for PIR. They considered full size storage systems with
MDS codes and they considered the case when only one of
the databases is compromised. They proposed a PIR technique
in which a cPoP of 11−R can be achieved in full size databases
where R is the MDS code rate. To compare our results with
[7], notice that if we assume that there is only one malicious
server in the cloud, then we can choose any two servers and
send half of the queries to each one of them. This way we
have a cPoP of 2 which is better than the results in [7] for
R > 1/2.
VI. SIMULATION
To numerically verify the results proved in section V, we
created m linearly independent random query vectors which
are used to expand the bases. Figure 2 demonstrates the
probability of the event that at least one of the base vectors
exists in the span of l = ⌊δm⌋ vectors for δ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and
0.4. Consistent with our results in section V, the probability of
the event that a base exists in the span of any set of l = ⌊δm⌋
vectors goes quickly to zero.
It is proved [41] that the problem of finding the minimum
spanning set of vectors is NP-Complete. It is even proved [42]
that this problem is NP-Hard to approximate. Therefore, in
general it is NP-Hard to find out if a given base exists in the
span of at most l = ⌊δm⌋ vectors out of the m vectors. For
our simulations we have used a brute force approach to check
if a given base exists in the span of at most l = ⌊δm⌋ vectors
out of the m existing random query vectors where m ≤ 20.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problems of security
and private information retrieval in distributed storage sys-
tems which are using a full rank encoding scheme based on
Random Linear Fountain (RLF) codes. We have proposed
an approach based on uniform random queries to achieve
information theoretic PIR property. We have proved that our
proposed technique can asymptotically achieve perfect secrecy
for a distributed storage system. Our proposed solution is
robust against a significant number of colluding servers in
the network. We have also shown that our technique can
8outperform MDS codes for storage systems in terms of PIR
cost for certain regimes.
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